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How many people should decide about monetary policy? In this paper, we take an empirical 
perspective on this issue, analyzing the relationship between the number of monetary policy decision-
makers and monetary policy outcomes. Using a new data set that characterizes Monetary Policy 
Committees (MPCs) in more than 30 countries from 1960 through 2000, we find a U-shaped relation 
between the membership size of MPCs and inflation; our results suggest that the lowest level of 
inflation is reached at MPCs with about seven to ten members. Similar results are obtained for other 
measures, such as inflation variability and output growth. We also find that MPC size influences the 
success of monetary targeting regimes. In contrast, there is no evidence that either turnover rates of 
MPC members or the membership composition of MPCs affect economic outcomes.  
JEL Code: E52, E58, E61.  
Keywords: central bank design, monetary policy committee, central bank board, central bank  
council, governance, inflation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The number of people who decide about monetary policy varies considerably across 
countries. At one extreme, decisions are made by a single person. Examples where the 
governor alone is responsible for monetary policy include the Bank of Israel and the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand. At the other extreme, central banks operate large monetary policy 
committees (MPCs) that comprise more than a dozen members.
1 A prominent example is the 
Governing Council of the European Central Bank which consists of 21 voting members. 
Similarly, in the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee, 19 members are participating in 
policy discussions, out of which 12 hold voting rights. Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, and 
Sterne (2000) report that 8 (of 82 surveyed) central banks have monetary policy boards with 
more than 10 members. 
 
The number of monetary policy decision-makers, while generally persistent, also frequently 
changes over time. In Germany, for instance, the Bundesbank MPC had initially 10 members, 
which changed to 18 members in the late 1950s and was cut back again to 17 after the 1992 
reform.
2 In Brazil, the central bank reform of the late 1980s effectively reduced MPC size 
from a maximum of 26 members to 9 members. In the U.K., in contrast, the 1997 reform act 
took monetary policy decisions out of the hands of the governor and into the hands of a nine 
member MPC. 
 
With MPCs varying across countries and years, a growing literature aims to quantify their 
optimal membership size as an important feature of central bank design. While there is a 
broad consensus that committees make better decisions than individuals, there is much less 
agreement on how large a committee should be.
3 Theory suggests that the benefits of 
increasing MPC size become smaller, and the costs of decision-making increase, as MPCs 
become larger. The magnitude of these offsetting forces, however, is likely to depend on a 
variety of factors. As a result, Goodfriend (2005, p. 85) argues that the “efficient size of a 
policy committee might vary across countries”.  
 
In this paper, we take an empirical perspective on this issue. More specifically, we examine to 
what extent the economic outcomes of monetary policy are possibly associated with the 
number of monetary policy decision-makers. To analyze this issue, we have compiled a new 
data set of the de jure and de facto membership size of MPCs; our unbalanced panel covers, 
on a yearly basis, more than 30 countries from 1960 through 2000. In addition, since de facto 
membership is derived from the names, positions, and membership dates of MPC members, 
we are able to compute the annual turnover rate of MPC membership. Finally, we gathered 
information on whether the MPC comprises industry representatives, regional delegates or 
government representatives. In our empirical analysis, we use all these measures to examine 
the effects of MPC design on inflation (and other economic outcomes), after controlling for 
other economic and institutional factors. 
 
                                                 
1 We use the term MPC in the broadest possible sense, describing the board, council, or committee (etc.) making 
actual monetary policy decisions. 
2 The Bundesbank reform of 1992 prevented a significant increase in the number of voting governors in its 
Central Bank Council (‘Zentralbankrat’) due to German unification. Before the reform, each federal state had a 
representative in the Council, and without reform, membership would have exceeded 22 – a number that, 
according to the Bundesbank, “would have greatly complicated that body’s decision-making processes” 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1992, p. 50). 
3 For surveys of the literature, see, among others, Gerling, Grüner, Kiel and Schulte (2005), Fujiki (2005), Sibert 
(2006), Vandenbussche (2006), and Berger (2006).  2 
To preview our main results, we find a U-shaped relationship between MPC size and 
inflation. More precisely, inflation first tends to fall as the number of MPC members 
increases, but this effect becomes smaller and eventually turns positive as MPCs grow in size. 
Taken at face value, our estimates imply that the minimum level of inflation is reached at 
MPCs with about seven to ten members, after holding constant for other factors. Similar 
results are obtained for other measures of economic outcomes such as inflation variability and 
output growth. In addition, we find that MPC size affects the success of monetary targeting 
regimes, as defined by Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007). In contrast, there is little evidence that 
other measures of MPC design, membership turnover rates and the membership composition 
of MPCs, are robustly associated with economic outcomes. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes our empirical methodology and the data. The heart of our paper 
is Section 4 which presents the empirical results. Section 5 provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2. Related Literature 
 
A sizable literature deals with the merits of smaller or larger MPCs from an applied 
theoretical and institutional perspective. For instance, Blinder (1998) and Gerlach-Kristen 
(2006) argue that, when it comes to the efficiency of monetary policy making, ‘bigger may be 
better’ because a more numerous MPC will process information on the state of the economy 
more effectively than an individual; in a group, information is pooled, there may be even 
cooperation in information processing, and extreme decisions are likely to be avoided.
4 
Blinder and Morgan (2005) and Lombardelli, Proudman, and Talbot (2005) provide 
supporting evidence based on experimental research. However, the gains from larger MPCs 
do not remain unbalanced. The literature surveyed in Sibert (2006) suggests that the 
advantages in information processing are likely to diminish as MPC size increases because 
members may have an incentive to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts of others. Similarly, Berger 
(2002, 2006) argues that in larger committees members will spend considerably more time 
‘sounding each other out’ bilaterally before or during meetings so that decision-making costs 
are growing (possibly exponentially) in MPC membership.
 5, 6 
 
Another set of papers takes a more empirical approach on the design of MPCs. Berger, 
Nitsch, and Lybek (2008) analyze differences in the size of MPCs in a cross-section sample of 
84 countries. Examining a large number of possible determinants, they find that larger and 
more heterogeneous countries, countries with stronger democratic institutions, countries with 
floating exchange rate regimes, and independent central banks with more staff tend to have 
larger MPCs; see also Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007).
7 Erhart, Lehment, and Vasquez-Paz 
                                                 
4 See also the discussion in Blinder (1998), Berk and Beirut (2004), and Riboni and Ruge-Murcia (2006). 
5 The governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, has recently defended the membership size of nine 
members in the MPC of the Bank of England by arguing: “I do think that more than nine would run the risk of 
making the process much less effective because a conversation among the nine is a key part of it and to have 
many more people would run the risk, as I think happens in somewhat larger councils that set policy, that some 
people have more say than others; there may be inner deliberations that take place because a very large body is 
simply too big to have a sensible discussion.” (UK House of Commons, 2007, p. 29) 
6 The weight of these arguments depends also on other institutional features of the MPC. Relevant factors 
include, for instance, whether decisions are consensus-based, which voting rules are in place, and the leadership 
provided by the MPC chairperson. On these and related issues see, for instance, von Hagen and Brückner (2001), 
Gersbach and Pachl (2004), Gerlach-Kristen (2006), and Blinder and Morgan (2007). For a recent review of 
issues in MPC design, see Blinder (2007) 
7 These findings are essentially positive in nature. To give them normative content, one must assume that 
observed MPC sizes are the outcome of optimal central bank design decisions and argue that larger and more  3 
(2007) examine differences in the volatility of inflation for MPCs with more or less than five 
members. Exploring cross-country evidence for 75 countries, they find that inflation volatility 
is higher in (the small subset of) countries with MPC sizes below five.
8  
 
More broadly, our paper is also close in spirit to the large literature that has empirically 
examined the effects of institutional features of central banking on monetary policy and policy 
outcomes. Some of these papers focus on features of central bank design such as central bank 
independence (see, among others, Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992, Campillo and Miron 
1997, de Haan and Kooi 2000), transparency in monetary policy (e.g., Fatas, Mihov, and Rose 
2007), or the personal background of central bankers (Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007). Other 
papers analyze the role of monetary policy strategies such as inflation targeting or exchange 




3. Methodology and Data 
 
Our principle approach is to explore the link between the membership size of a central bank’s 
monetary policy decision-making body and monetary policy outcomes, in particular the level 
of inflation. Price stability or low inflation is among the more prominent targets of central 
banks around the world. Indeed, in many cases, low inflation (either directly or through 
intermediate targets) is the overarching goal of monetary policy; see Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, 
Roger, and Sterne (2000) for a survey. In addition to the level of inflation, however, we also 
look at inflation variability and output growth (mainly as a robustness check). To the extent 
that there is indeed an empirical association between MPC size and economic outcomes, our 
findings may have the potential of decisively informing the debate on the optimal size of 
MPCs.  
 
To examine the effect of committee size on monetary policy outcomes, we apply various 
empirical techniques. First, we conduct a simple event-study analysis that explores the effects 
of variations in committee size over time. The results are informative but somewhat limited 
by the small number of sizable MPC size changes in our sample. Therefore, in a second step, 
we make systematic use of the panel nature of our data, looking at the effects of MPC size on 
policy outcomes across time and countries.  
 
Our panel approach follows the example of Fatas, Mihov and Rose (2007); that is, we 
estimate equations of the form: 
 
Π i,t+1 = α + β MPCsize i,t + Σj γj X i,t + Σk δk Y i,t + ε i,t ,  (1)
 
where Π i,t+1 denotes the inflation rate of country i at time t+1, MPCsize is the membership 
size of the MPC, X is a set of other central bank features such as the (de jure) existence of a 
quantitative monetary target and the ability of a given central bank to meet that target in a 
given year, Y is a set of country-specific characteristics that may (potentially) affect inflation 
such as a country’s openness to international trade and the current state of the business cycle, 
and ε is a normally distributed disturbance. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
heterogeneous currency areas should indeed have larger MPCs. Erhart and Vasquez-Paz (2007) provide an 
interesting attempt in that direction. 
8 In their sample, eight out of 75 countries have MPCs with less than five members. Most of these countries are 
small in size.  4 
The relevant data are obtained from various sources. At the heart of our data set is a new 
(unbalanced) panel that covers the identities of MPC members for 33 central banks from 1960 
to 2006. These (raw) data were compiled in a three-step procedure. First, we identify the 
central bank’s monetary policy decision-making body, the MPC. This information is typically 
available from the central bank law but, where necessary, we cross-checked the information 
with central bank officials. In most cases, the committee that runs a central bank’s day-to-day 
operations also takes de jure responsibilities for monetary policy decision-making.
9 Second, 
we extract relevant information describing the MPC from central bank laws. Features that are 
frequently defined in the law include the membership size, the composition of the decision-
making body, the frequency of meetings, voting rules and majorities, and specific 
requirements on individual members (e.g., nationality, educational background). For instance, 
we distinguish in our analysis between voting and non-voting members. We also construct a 
set of other measures of potential interest, including the de jure MPC size and the fraction of 
industry, regional, or government representatives in the committee.  
 
Finally, using a variety of sources such as annual reports and other forms of central bank 
communication, we identify individual MPC members and their positions. Since we have 
information on the entry and exit dates of individuals, we use this data to construct measures 
of de facto MPC size and MPC membership turnover. 
 
Other institutional and economic data are mainly obtained from standard sources. We rely on 
Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007) for information on the presence of de jure monetary policy 
targets and whether a particular target was met in practice. Also for most economic data, 
which often originally stems from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, we have 
turned to Fatas, Mihov, and Rose’s extractions from standard databases to allow full 
comparability of our results. A data appendix provides a detailed list of the variables used in 
the empirical analysis and a description of the sources. 
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
We begin by describing our data on MPC membership size in more detail. Figure 1 portrays 
the evolution of de facto MPC size over time. The figure graphs the average membership size 
for the full sample and, since data availability varies across years, also for different groups of 
countries for which we have data covering similar periods. The averages are based on the full 
membership size of committees (i.e., including non-voting MPC members) since, on a 
practical level, all MPC members are likely to contribute to MPC decisions. However, all of 
our empirical results are robust to using only voting members. 
 
There are (at least) three notable observations. First, average MPC size is fairly persistent. 
While there are some short-term fluctuations due to vacancies or minor adjustments, there are 
very few radical changes in average committee size, which consistently averages between six 
and eight members since the late 1950s. A notable exception is Brazil where the size (and 
composition) of the monetary policy committee has fluctuated enormously.  
                                                 
9 We ignore any informal or semi-official arrangements in the preparation of monetary policy decisions (e.g., 
when the governor or the board holds consultations before taking decisions) mostly because this type of 
arrangements may be easily changed on an ad hoc basis and is, in the end, very hard to document.  5 
Figure 1: MPC Membership Size 
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9 countries
11 countries 4 countries
Notes: Panel (a) plots the average membership size of monetary policy decision-making 
bodies; the numbers denote sample size. Panel (b) depicts the average MPC size for various 
groups of countries. Countries were grouped according to data availability. The groups are as 
follows. 5 countries: Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Switzerland, and U.K.; 11 countries: 
Australia, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Trinidad & 
Tobago, Turkey, U.S.; 4 countries: Botswana, Brazil, Mauritius, and Singapore; 9 countries 
(euro area): Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal. 
  6 
 
Second, to the extent that there is change over time, it appears that MPCs are converging in 
membership size. While the countries in our sample are basically grouped randomly 
according to data availability, it is interesting to note that the group of countries with initially 
small MPCs (labeled ‘5 countries’) experienced on average an increase in membership size; 
this group of countries includes, among others, the Bank of England which has newly 
established an MPC in 1997. In contrast, groups with relatively large MPCs have tended to 
reduce membership size. 
 
Third, the average MPC size of central banks in European countries that later joined the euro 
area (labeled as ‘9 countries’ in Figure 1) appears to have been, on average, 
disproportionately large. Especially in small open economies such as Austria, Belgium, 
Ireland and Portugal, the decision-making bodies were relatively large, often comprising more 
than 10 members. 
 
 
4.2 Event Study 
 
Next, we examine episodes of major changes in MPC membership size in greater detail. In 
particular, we identify episodes when the de facto size of a MPC has increased or decreased 
by more than two members in a given year.
10 Taking an event study approach, we then 
analyze (in univariate fashion) the dynamic behavior of variable(s) of interest before and after 
that change. 
 
Figure 2 graphs the size of committees before and after major MPC size changes. There are 
five episodes of large and rapid decreases in committee size in our sample and three episodes 
of enlargement. During those adjustments, committee size has changed, on average, by six 
members. Interestingly, it turns out that committees whose membership size was reduced 
were initially larger than the average, while committees where membership size has sizably 
increased were initially disproportionately small. This finding provides some additional 
evidence for a process of convergence in committee size that we have already observed 
above. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of inflation and output growth during episodes of decreasing 
(‘fewer members’) and increasing (‘more members’) MPC size. For each outcome variable, 
we present two sets of results. The upper panel contains results derived from the full sample; 
analogous graphs for a reduced sample, where the high-inflation countries Argentina and 
Brazil are excluded, are presented in the lower panel. As shown, inflation tends to be lower 
after a reduction in MPC size, while there is little noticeable change after an enlargement of 
MPCs. However, these results crucially depend on the experiences of Argentina and Brazil; 
when the two high-inflation countries are excluded, this pattern disappears. For real GDP 
growth, results appear to be slightly stronger. A decrease in MPC size tends to benefit growth, 
while MPC enlargement is associated with lower growth, irrespective of the sample. 
 
                                                 
10 Applying other selection criteria would yield essentially identical results. For instance, almost all of these 
changes were accompanied by amendments in central bank law, while adjustments in de jure committee size 
have sometimes led to little real world changes because of existing vacancies (e.g., in Germany). Also, choosing 
a relative (instead of absolute) cut-off makes little difference because membership size of small committees has 
rarely changed.  7 









































































































































Notes: The dots show the number of de facto voting members; lines represent, for 
comparison, the sample average membership size of MPCs.  8 
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Notes: Dotted lines show averages of the variable of interest for central banks with large 
changes in membership size; lines represent, for comparison, the sample averages.  9 
While these findings are generally informative, any linkage between MPC size and policy 
outcomes is likely to be conditional on other factors. For instance, if there is indeed an 
optimal level of MPC size (as suggested by the theoretical literature briefly reviewed in 
Section 2), a change in membership size should lower inflation only if initial MPC size is 
further away from its optimum. In the following, we examine the relationship between MPC 
characteristics and various policy outcomes in more detail. 
 
 
4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
To take full account of the panel nature of our data, we follow Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007) 
and estimate the augmented inflation model in (1) using OLS. In our default specification, the 
dependent variable is a country’s annual rate of inflation (in percentage points) in the 
following year; this timing structure helps to limit potential simultaneity bias. We initially 
exclude Argentina and Brazil, two outliers in our sample that experienced inflation rates of 




The impact of MPC size on inflation 
 
Table 1 presents our baseline estimation results. The coefficient of interest is the estimate of β 
which captures the effect of the de facto number of voting members in a monetary policy 
committee on a country’s inflation rate. In the linear specification in column 1, the estimated 
β coefficient is negative, statistically significant and economically relevant, implying that 
larger committees are typically associated with lower inflation. The point estimate of -0.25 
indicates that for any additional member in the monetary policy-making committee annual 
inflation is reduced by, on average, a quarter of a percentage point. Taken at face value, this 
estimate seems to support the notion that larger MPCs reach better policy decisions (leading 
to lower inflation) than smaller groups or a single central banker.
12 
 
Still, it is not necessarily clear that group performance is a linear function of membership size. 
In fact, it has been frequently argued that the quality of MPC decisions may decrease as 
additional group members are added due to coordination problems and distorting incentives in 
information processing; see, for instance, Sibert (2006) and Berger (2006). 
 
Therefore, to identify possible nonlinearities, we add a quadratic term of MPC size to our 
estimation model. As shown in the next column, this extension improves the empirical fit of 
the regression. The linear and quadratic coefficients are indeed highly significant and take 
opposite signs. Our estimates indicate that moving from an individual decision-maker to a 
decision-making body with ten members is associated with a decline in inflation by about 8 
percentage points, an effect that is completely reversed when membership size rises further to 
19 members. In fact, committees with more than 20 members appear to be associated with 
even higher inflation than for an individual central banker. Thus, consistent with the theory of 
optimal committee size, the positive effect on inflation dies off and eventually becomes 
negative as committee size increases. 
                                                 
11 Temple (1998) has highlighted the role of extreme and influential observations in this literature. Moreover, 
excluding Argentina and Brazil is also the approach taken by Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007). 
12 It should be noted that , for most countries and periods in our sample, inflation was clearly (and sometimes 
highly) positive, implying that a reduction in inflation was typically beneficial for the economy.  10 
Table 1: Baseline results and full sample 
 
 
Sample Baseline  Full 
(with Argentina, 
Brazil) 
      







  (9.7) 
De Facto Membership Squared     0.11* 
(0.05) 
   1.19# 
(0.61) 
De Jure Quant. Monetary 
Target  
-12.7** 
  (3.7) 
-14.2** 
  (4.2) 
-127.1** 
  (36.2) 
-128.9** 
  (36.0) 
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Observations  815 815 842 842 
Adj. R-squared  0.21 0.23 0.13 0.16 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is lead of inflation. **, * and # denote significant 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Membership size effects are jointly significant at 
6 percent level in the full sample.  11 
 
This finding is further strengthened by results based on the full sample, tabulated in the two 
columns on the right of Table 1. Extending the sample to also include Argentina and Brazil, 
two countries not only with (extremely) high inflation but also (very) large committees, 
changes the sign of the β coefficient in the linear estimation so that, effectively, the high-
inflation experience of large committees dominates the results. Still, it is reassuring to note 
that the results for the non-linear model remain qualitatively unchanged with the full sample 
is analyzed. 
 
Besides MPC size, our model includes various (standard) covariates of inflation. For instance, 
following Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007), we control for the presence of quantitative targets 
for monetary policy and whether these targets have been reached. The negative and mostly 
significant coefficients on these variables indicate that transparent goals for monetary policy 
indeed help to lower inflation. Also, countries with higher per capita income and more 
prudent fiscal policies tend to have significantly lower inflation rates. In contrast, trade 
openness and the economic size of a country (proxied by real GDP) are uncorrelated with 
inflationary outcomes. Deviations from average GDP growth are at best weakly associated 
with inflation (in the extended sample that includes Brazil and Argentina). 
 
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the nonlinear relationship between MPC size and 
inflation outcome. More importantly, the plots easily allow identifying the membership size 
that minimizes inflation (conditional on other factors). As shown, our baseline estimates 
indicate that MPCs with ten members are most successful in curbing inflation. When also 
Argentina and Brazil are included, the MPC size that minimizes inflation is seven members.
13 
Interestingly, in practice, a majority of central bank MPCs appears to fall exactly into this size 
range; see Fry, Julius, Mahadeva, Roger, and Sterne (2000). 
 
We have performed extensive sensitivity analyses. Table 2 applies various panel estimators, 
controlling for time-fixed effects and country-fixed effects. With these modifications, the 
relationship between MPC size and inflation is strengthened when time-fixed effects are 
added but loses significance when the regression includes country-fixed effects. As a result, 
the observed empirical association between MPC size and inflation appears to be mainly 
driven by the cross-country variation in our sample; Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007) report 
similar findings for the effects of quantitative monetary targets. In unreported results, we have 
also experimented with more aggregate (index) measures of MPC size to filter out minor 
variations in membership size over time; reassuringly, these estimates turn out to be much less 
influenced by the inclusion of country-fixed effects. 
 
                                                 
13 This result is mostly driven by the fact that the two high inflation countries were also characterized by 
relatively large MPCs during most of the sample period.  12 





















Benchmark (LHS) W/ Argentina & Brazil (RHS)
 
 
Notes: Inflation in percent. Simulations are based on the estimation results reported in Table 1 
keeping all other variables constant. The minimum inflation rate has been calibrated to zero.  13 
Table 2: Alternative estimation techniques 
 
 
Estimation  Year fixed effects  Country fixed effects 
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Monetary Target  
-12.9** 
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  (5.3) 
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Observations  815 815 815 815 
Adj. R-squared  0.25 0.27    
Within R-squared    0.17  0.17 
 
Notes: Baseline sample. OLS estimation. Dependent variable is lead of inflation. **, * and # 
denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  14 
 
The impact of MPC size on inflation variability and growth 
 
Table 3 explores alternative measures for the success of monetary policy. Our key findings 
seem strongly robust. For instance, MPC size is not only associated with the level of inflation 
but also affects (in similar fashion) inflation variability. That is, having more members in the 
MPC is on average associated with lower inflation variability, while the non-linear 
specification again suggests a U-shaped relationship between MPC size and the monetary 
policy outcome. Similarly, we find a nonlinear association between MPC size and GDP 
growth; enlarging a MPC initially tends to increase output growth, but this effect is reversed 
for large committees. In sum, these findings imply that any gains from varying MPC size in 
terms of lower and less volatile inflation do not involve a trade-off with output growth; quite 
on the contrary, our results suggest that there is a consistent nonlinear association between 
MPC size and monetary policy outcomes. 
 
 
The role of other MPC characteristics 
 
In Table 4, we analyze the effect of other measures that characterize a central bank’s decision-
making body on inflation. We begin with replacing our continuous measure of de facto 
membership size with a set of binary dummy variables that group MPCs into size quartiles. 
The results confirm our earlier finding of a nonlinear relationship between committee size and 
inflation. Having sorted MPCs by increasing membership size and using the top quartile as 
control group, moving to a quartile that comprises larger MPCs tends to reduce inflation 
although this effect becomes smaller as MPC size increases. Next, we substitute de facto 
MPC membership size with MPC size as specified (de jure) in the central bank law.
14 The 
results are basically identical to our default specification, though statistically slightly weaker. 
We also restrict our measure of de facto committee size to include only voting committee 
members. Again, the results are basically unchanged.
15 
 
Moving beyond measures of membership size, we also explore two measures that capture the 
extent of MPC membership turnover. More specifically, we examine the effects of the 
frequencies of changes of MPC membership and the effects of changes of the chairman of the 
MPC (that is, the central bank governor) on inflation.
16 None of the estimated coefficients, 
however, is statistically different from zero—a finding that is perhaps not terribly surprising 
since we are unable to distinguish between regular and irregular changes in MPC 
membership. Also, Sturm and de Haan (2001) and Dreher, de Haan, and Sturm (2007) find 
that governor turnover rates are, at best, weakly associated with inflation. 
 
                                                 
14 When a range is given, we use the mid-point. 
15 When only voting members are considered, our estimation results indicate that inflation is minimized at an 
MPC size of nine members. 
16 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to evaluate the relevance of MPC membership turnover 
for economic outcomes. The literature on central bank turnover after Cukierman (1992) has focused exclusively 
on governors.  15 
Table 3: Other dependent variables  
 
 
Dependent variable  Inflation variability Output  growth 

















De Jure Quant. 































































      
Estimation  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Observations  815 815 818 818 
Adj. R-squared  0.28 0.28 0.89 0.89 
 
Notes: Baseline sample. OLS estimation. **, * and # denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 
percent level, respectively.  16 
Table 4: Other measures of MPC size 
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(1.62) 
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Observations  815 818 818 816 816 807 808 
Adj. R-squared  0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.21 
 
Notes: Baseline sample. OLS estimation. Dependent variable is lead of inflation. **, * and # 
denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Membership size effects for 
voting members are jointly significant at 4 percent level; the estimates imply a minimum 
inflation MPC size of 9 members.  17 
Table 5: Other MPC characteristics 
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Observations  815 815 815 815 
Adj. R-squared  0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
Notes: Baseline sample. OLS estimation. Dependent variable is lead of inflation. **, * and # 
denote significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  18 
Table 6: MPC Membership size and quantitative targets 
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Observations  815 815 815 
Adj. R-squared  0.23 0.23 0.23 
 
Notes: OLS estimation. Dependent variable is lead of inflation. **, * and # denote significant 
at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.  19 
Many central bank laws also specify the composition of the decision-making body. For 
instance, a frequent restriction is the presence of one or more government representatives in 
the MPC. Other central bank laws may require the presence of regional or industry 
representatives (such as, for instance, a delegate from the national banking association). In 
Table 5, we examine the impact of these restrictions on inflation. More specifically, we add a 
separate dummy variable for the de facto presence of each category of representatives. While 
we find no significant effect for the presence of regional delegates in the committee, our 
empirical findings suggest that central banks with required government representation in the 
MPC achieve, on average, lower inflation. This result, which is in contrast to the literature on 
central bank independence
17, seems to suggest hat membership of government representatives 
in the decision-making body of a central bank is not automatically linked with a government-
dominated, inflation-prone monetary regime. We obtain similar (though economically smaller 
and statistically weaker) results for the presence of industry representatives. In a joint 
estimation, however, only the government representative effect remains of borderline 
significance. 
 
Finally, Table 6 examines the possible interaction between the size of a central bank 
committee and quantitative targets in monetary policy. Fatas, Mihov, and Rose (2007) argue 
that both having established and meeting a quantitative goal for monetary policy is robustly 
associated with lower inflation. We explore whether MPC size possibly affects inflation 
through changing the effectiveness of the link between policy targets and economic outcomes; 
that is, we examine whether the effects of having and hitting a quantitative target differ for 
MPCs of different membership sizes.  
 
To investigate this question, we distinguish between large and small MPCs. More specifically, 
we define a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a given MPC has more than ten 
members and, thus, is ‘too large’ by the standards of our earlier results. This dummy variable 
is then interacted with the variables signaling the presence of a monetary target and whether 
the target is hit and added to our default model. The results suggest that having a quantitative 
target may no longer be effective in reducing inflation when the MPC is too large: while the 
declared target dummy remains significantly negative, the coefficient on the interaction term 
with the large MPCs dummy variable is significantly positive and quantitatively larger. Thus, 
the inflation-lowering effect of having a transparent target for monetary policy is strongest for 
small central bank boards with 10 or fewer members. Similarly, hitting a monetary target 
proves to be particularly helpful for achieving low inflation when the board is small in size, 





There is a growing interest in central bank design and especially the optimal size of the 
central bank’s monetary policy decision-making body. Empirically, the membership size of 
Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) differs considerably across countries and, to a lower 
extent, also varies over time. However, while there is a broad consensus that groups make 
better decisions than individuals, there is little agreement on how large the MPC should be. 
Theory suggests that the net benefits of MPC size are decreasing as more members are added, 
mainly because decision-making costs and externalities in information processing gain in 
importance. Since the precise magnitude of these forces, however, depends on a variety of 
factors, the efficient size of a MPC is likely to vary across countries.  
                                                 
17 See, for instance, Berger, de Haan, and Eijffinger (2001) for a survey.  20 
 
This paper adds to the debate from an empirical perspective, exploring the association 
between MPC size and the economic outcomes of monetary policy. To analyze this issue, we 
compiled a new data set that characterizes MPCs in over thirty countries from 1960 through 
2000. Our data set contains information on the de jure and de facto membership size, the 
turnover in membership and the membership composition of a central bank’s MPC. We then 
use all these measures to examine the effects of MPC design on inflation (and other economic 
outcomes), after controlling for other economic and institutional factors.  
 
In our empirical analysis, we find a U-shaped relationship between MPC size and inflation. 
Our estimates suggest that the minimum level of inflation is reached at MPC sizes between 
seven and ten members, depending on the regression specification. Qualitatively similar 
results are obtained for inflation variability and output growth. While there are also some 
indications that MPC size influences the success of monetary targeting regimes, there is little 
evidence that MPC membership turnover and the membership composition of the MPC shape 
economic outcomes. Overall, our results strongly confirm that the membership size of a 
central bank’s decision-making body is an important feature of central bank design. 
  21 
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Appendix 1: Data sources and variable list 
 
 
Variable: Description:  Source: 
Inflation  CPI inflation, %, from IFS  Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Inflation Variability  Standard deviation of inflation over 
(non-overlapping) five-year intervals 
Own compilation 
Output Growth  Real GDP growth, %  Own compilation 
De Facto Membership  Number of actual members in the 
MPC 
Own compilation 
De Jure Membership  Number of members in the MPC as 




Fraction of membership changes in 









Dummy variable if MPC comprises 
government representative(s) 
Own compilation 
Regional Representatives  Dummy variable if MPC comprises 
regional representative(s) 
Own compilation 
Industry Representatives  Dummy variable if MPC comprises 
industry representative(s) 
Own compilation 
De Jure Quant. Monetary 
Target  
Dummy variable if the country had a 
quantitative monetary policy target 
Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Quant. Monetary Success  Dummy variable if the country hit its 
de jure quantitative target 
Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Openness (% GDP)  Trade, % GDP, from PWT  Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Budget (% GDP)  Government budget balance, % GDP, 
from IFS & WDI 
Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Business Cycle  
(Growth –Avg Growth) 
Difference between real GDP growth 
and average (country-specific) GDP 
growth, percentage points 
Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Log Real GDP per capita  Log of real GDP per capita (chain 
method), from PWT 
Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
Log Real GDP  Log of real GDP, computed from per 
capita GDP and population, from 
PWT 
Fatas, Mihov & Rose 
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